![]() The development of Japanese air power was extremely easy for American observers to track throughout the 1920s. With that said, here we go.Įxample of a typical naval attaché report ( WARNING Large Photos): This first post is intentionally broad as it is intended as short summary, since I don't want to rewrite my entire thesis, and you folks certainly wouldn't want to read the whole darn thing. You are free to ask me questions about specific points and I will expand on them as much as possible. I have read literally thousands of American naval and military attaché reports (and other random stuff, like British intelligence intercepts from the London Naval Conference), along with all sorts of books, journal articles, etc. Any arguments that you see written here have primary and/or secondary sources to back them up. I will focus exclusively on the capability side for this summary, as in my thesis. To begin, net assessment is done through looking at both how strong the intelligence target's forces are (their capability) and what they intend to do with that strength (their intention). As the title of the thread suggests, I have done a lot of research and writing regarding American intelligence assessments of Japanese air and naval power during the interwar period. As my thesis nears completion, I have decided to write a relatively short summary of my findings here since I'm sure it will interest at least some of you fine people. ![]()
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